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Abstract
The Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) method is a ubiquitous meta-algorithm that
works as follows: A distribution is maintained on a certain set, and at each step the probability
assigned to element γ is multiplied by (1 − C(γ)) > 0 where C(γ) is the “cost” of element
γ and then rescaled to ensure that the new values form a distribution. We analyze MWU in
congestion games where agents use arbitrary admissible constants as learning rates  and prove
convergence to exact Nash equilibria. Our proof leverages a novel connection between MWU and
the Baum-Welch algorithm, the standard instantiation of the Expectation-Maximization (EM)
algorithm for hidden Markov models (HMM). Interestingly, this convergence result does not
carry over to the nearly homologous MWU variant where at each step the probability assigned to
element γ is multiplied by (1− )C(γ) even for the most innocuous case of two-agent, two-strategy
load balancing games, where such dynamics can provably lead to limit cycles or even chaotic
behavior.
1 Introduction
The Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) is a ubiquitous meta-algorithm with numerous appli-
cations in different fields [2]. It is particularly useful in game theory due to its regret-minimizing
properties [19, 10]. It is typically introduced in two nearly identical variants, the one in which at
each step the probability assigned to action γ is multiplied by (1− C(γ)) and the one in which
it is multiplied by (1− )C(γ) where C(γ) is the cost of action γ. We will refer to the first as the
linear variant, MWU`, and the second as the exponential, MWUe. In the literature there is little
distinction between these two variants as both carry the same advantageous regret-minimizing
property. It is also well known that in order to achieve sublinear regret, the learning rate  must
be decreasing as time progresses. This constraint raises a natural question: Are there interesting
classes of games where MWU behaves well without the need to fine-tune its learning rate?
A natural setting to test the learning behavior of MWU with constant learning rates  is the
class of congestion games. Unfortunately, even for the most innocuous instances of congestion games
MWUe fails to converge to equilibria. For example, even in the simplest case of two balls two bins
games,1 MWUe with  = 1 − e−10 is shown to converge to a limit cycle of period 2 for infinitely
many initial conditions (Theorem 5.3). If the cost functions of the two edges are not identical then
we create instances of two player load balancing games such that MWUe has periodic orbits of
length k for all k > 0, as well as uncountable many initial conditions which never settle on any
periodic orbit but instead exhibit an irregular behavior known as Li-Yorke chaos (Corollary 5.6).
1n balls n bin games are symmetric load balancing games with n agent and n edges/elements each with a cost
function of c(x)=x. We normalize costs equal to c(x) = x/n so that they lie in [0, 1].
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The source of these problems is exactly the large, fixed learning rate , e.g.,  ≈ 1 for costs in
[0, 1]. Intuitively, the key aspect of the problem can be captured by (simultaneous) best response
dynamics. If both agents start from the same edge and best-respond simultaneously they will
land on the second edge which now has a load of two. In the next step they will both jump back
to the first edge and this motion will be continued perpetually. Naturally, MWUe dynamics are
considerably more intricate as they evolve over mixed strategies and allow for more complicated
non-equilibrium behavior but the key insight is correct. Each agent has the right goal, decrease his
own cost and hence the potential of the game, however, as they pursue this goal too aggressively
they cancel each other’s gains and lead to unpredictable non-converging behavior.
In a sense, the cautionary tales above agree with our intuition. Large, constant learning rates 
nullify the known performance guarantees of MWU. We should expect erratic behavior in such cases.
The typical way to circumvent these problems is through careful monitoring and possibly successive
halving of the  parameter, a standard technique in the MWU literature. In this paper, we explore
an alternative, cleaner, and surprisingly elegant solution to this problem. We show that applying
MWU`, the linear variant of MWU, suffices to guarantee convergence in all congestion games.
Our contribution.
Our key result is the proof of convergence of MWU` in congestion games. The main technical
contribution is a proof that the potential of the mixed state is always strictly decreasing along any
nontrivial trajectory (Theorem 4.1). This result holds for all congestion games, irrespective of the
number of agents or the size, topology of the strategy sets. Moreover, each agent i may be applying
different learning rates i. The only restriction on the set of allowable learning rates i is that for
each agent the multiplicative factor (1− iCi(s)) should be positive for all strategy outcomes s.2
Arguing convergence to equilibria for all initial conditions (Theorem 4.4) and further, convergence
to Nash equilibria for all interior initial conditions (Theorem 4.6) follows. Proving that the potential
always decreases (Theorem 4.1) hinges upon discovering a novel interpretation of MWU dynamics.
Specifically, we show that the class of dynamical systems derived by applying MWU` in congestion
games is a special case of a convergent class of dynamical systems introduced by Baum and Eagon
(Theorem 3.4 [5]). The most well known member of this class is the classic Baum-Welch algorithm,
the standard instantiation of the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm for hidden Markov
models (HMM). Effectively, the proof of convergence of both these systems boils down to a proof of
membership to the same class of Baum-Eagon systems (see section 3.3 for more details on these
connections).
We conclude by providing simple congestion games where MWUe fails to converge. The main
technical contribution of this section is proving convergence to a limit cycle, specifically a periodic
orbit of length two, for the simplest case of two balls two bins games for infinitely many initial
conditions (Theorem 5.3). After normalizing costs to lie in [0, 1], i.e. c(x) = x/2, we prove that
almost all symmetric non-equilibrium initial conditions converge to a unique limit cycle when both
agents use learning rate  = 1− e−10. In contrast, since 1−  · C(s) ≥ 1− (1− e−10)1 = e−10 > 0,
MWU` successfully converges to equilibrium. Establishing chaotic behavior for the case of edges
with different cost functions is rather straightforward in comparison (Corollary 5.6). The key step is
to exploit symmetries in the system to reduce it to a single dimensional one and then establish the
existence of a periodic orbit of length three. The existence of periodic orbits of any length as well
as chaotic orbits then follows from the Li-Yorke theorem 3.3 [25] (see section 3.2 for background on
chaos and dynamical systems).
2This is an absolutely minimal restriction so that the denominator of MWU` cannot become equal to zero.
2
2 Related Work
Congestion/potential games: Congestion games are amongst the most well known and thor-
oughly studied class of games. Proposed in [31] and isomorphic to potential games [28], they have
been successfully employed in myriad modeling problems. The study the price of anarchy, i.e.
efficiency guarantees for equilibria, in congestion games is arguably amongst the most developed
areas within algorithmic game theory, e.g., [24, 33, 14, 18, 16, 32].
It is common knowledge that better-response dynamics in congestion games converge. In these
dynamics, in every round, exactly one agent deviates to a better strategy. If two or more agents move
at the same time then convergence is not guaranteed. Despite the numerous positive convergence
results for concurrent dynamics in congestion games, e.g., [17, 7, 1, 6, 22, 9, 13], we know of no
prior work establishing such a clean, deterministic convergence result to exact Nash equilibria
for general atomic congestion games. MWU has also been studied in congestion games. In [23]
randomized variants of the exponential version of the MWU are shown to converge w.h.p. to pure
Nash equilibria as long as the learning rate  is small enough. In contrast our positive results for
linear MWU` hold deterministically and for all learning rates. Our paper establishes that these
results cannot be extended to the exponential MWUe even for two balls two bin games.
Multiplicative Weights Update and connections: The multiplicative weights update
method is a widely used meta-algorithm. From the perspective of online learning it belongs to the
class of regret minimizing algorithms. As a result it is widely applicable in algorithmic game theory,
as the time average behavior of MWU leads to (approximate) coarse correlated equilibria (CCE)
for which price of anarchy guarantees apply [32]. In the last couple of years several theoretical
results have been proved on the intersection of computer science, learning and evolution for which
MWU was the linking component. In [12, 11] Chastain et al. show that standard models of haploid
evolution can be directly interpreted as MWU dynamics [20] employed in coordination games. Meir
and Parkes [27], Mehta et al. [26] have shed more light on these connections.
Non-convergent dynamics: Outside the class of congestion games, there exist several negative
results in the literature concerning the non-convergence of MWU and variants thereof. In particular,
in [15] it was shown that the multiplicative updates algorithm fails to find the unique Nash equilibrium
of the 3× 3 Shapley game. Similar non-convergent results have been proven for perturbed zero-sum
games [4], as well as for the continuous time version of MWU, the replicator dynamics [21, 30, 29].
The possibility of applying Li-Yorke type arguments for MWU in congestion games with two agents
was inspired by a remark in [3] for the case of continuum of agents. Our paper is the first to our
knowledge where non-convergent MWU behavior in congestion games is formally proven capturing
both limit cycles and chaos and we do so in the minimal case of two balls two bin games.
3 Preliminaries
Notation. We use boldface letters, e.g., x, to denote column vectors (points). For a function
f : Rm → Rm, by fn we denote the composition of f with itself n times, namely f ◦ f ◦ · · · ◦ f︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
.
3.1 Congestion Games
A congestion game [31] is defined by the tuple (N ;E; (Si)i∈N ; (ce)e∈E) where N is the set of agents,
N = |N |, E is a set of resources (also known as edges or bins or facilities) and each player i has a
set Si of subsets of E (Si ⊆ 2E) and |Si| ≥ 1. Each strategy si ∈ Si is a set of edges and ce is a
positive cost (latency) function associated with facility e. We use small greek characters like γ, δ to
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denote different strategies/paths. For a strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ), the cost of player i is
given by ci(s) =
∑
e∈si ce(`e(s)), where `e(s) is the number of players using e in s (the load of edge
e). The potential function is defined to be Φ(s) =
∑
e∈E
∑`e(s)
j=1 ce(j).
For each i ∈ N and γ ∈ Si, piγ denotes the probability player i chooses strategy γ. We denote by
∆(Si) = {p ≥ 0 :
∑
γ piγ = 1} the set of mixed (randomized) strategies of player i and ∆ = ×i∆(Si)
the set of mixed strategies of all players. We use ciγ = Es−i∼p−ici(γ, s−i) to denote the expected
cost of player i given that he chooses strategy γ and cˆi =
∑
δ∈Si piδciδ to denote his expected cost.
3.2 Dynamical Systems and Chaos
Let x(t+1) = f(x(t)) be a discrete time dynamical system with update rule f : Rm → Rm. The point
z is called a fixed point of f if f(z) = z. A sequence (f t(x(0)))t∈N is called a trajectory or orbit of
the dynamics with x(0) as starting point. A common technique to show that a dynamical system
converges to a fixed point is to construct a function P : Rm → R such that P (f(x)) > P (x) unless
x is a fixed point. We call P a Lyapunov or potential function.
Definition 3.1. C = {z1, . . . , zk} is called a periodic orbit of length k if zi+1 = f(zi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k−1
and f(zk) = z1. Each point z1, . . . , zk is called periodic point of period k. If the dynamics converges
to some periodic orbit, we also use the term limit cycle.
Some dynamical systems converge and their behavior can be fully understood and some others
have strange, chaotic behavior. There are many different definitions for what chaotic behavior and
chaos means. In this paper we follow the definition of chaos by Li and Yorke. Let us first give
the definition of a scrambled set. Given a dynamical system with update rule f , a pair x and y
is called “scrambled” if limn→∞ inf |fn(x)− fn(y)| = 0 (the trajectories get arbitrarily close) and
also limn→∞ sup |fn(x)− fn(y)| > 0 (the trajectories move apart). A set S is called “scrambled” if
∀x, y ∈ S, the pair is “scrambled”.
Definition 3.2 (Li and Yorke). A discrete time dynamical system with update rule f , f : X → X
continuous on a compact set X ⊂ R is called chaotic if (a) for each k ∈ Z+, there exists a periodic
point p ∈ X of period k and (b) there is an uncountably infinite set S ⊆ X that is “scrambled”.
Li and Yorke proved the following theorem [25] (there is another theorem of similar flavor due
to Sharkovskii [34]):
Theorem 3.3 (Period three implies chaos). Let J be an interval and let F : J → J be continuous.
Assume there is a point a ∈ J for which the points b = F (a), c = F 2(a) and d = F 3(a), satisfy
d ≤ a < b < c (or d ≥ a > b > c).
Then
1. For every k = 1, 2, . . . there is a periodic point in J having period k.
2. There is an uncountable set S ⊂ J (containing no periodic points), which satisfies the following
conditions:
• For every p, q ∈ S with p 6= q,
lim
n→∞ sup |F
n(p)− Fn(q)| > 0 and lim
n→∞ inf |F
n(p)− Fn(q)| = 0.
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• For every point p ∈ S and periodic point q ∈ J ,
lim
n→∞ sup |F
n(p)− Fn(q)| > 0.
Notice that if there is a periodic point with period 3, then the hypothesis of the theorem will be
satisfied.
3.3 Baum-Eagon Inequality, Baum-Welch and EM
We start this subsection by stating the Baum-Eagon inequality. This inequality will be used to show
that MWU` converges to fixed points and more specifically Nash equilibria for congestion games.
Theorem 3.4 (Baum-Eagon inequality [5]). Let P (x) = P ({xij}) be a polynomial with nonnegative
coefficients homogeneous of degree d in its variables {xij}. Let x = {xij} be any point of the domain
D : xij ≥ 0,
∑qi
j=1 xij = 1, i = 1, 2, ..., p, j = 1, 2, ..., qi. For x = {xij} ∈ D let =(x) = ={xij} denote
the point of D whose i, j coordinate is
=(x)ij =
(
xij
∂P
∂xij
∣∣∣∣
(x)
)/
qi∑
j′=1
xij′
∂P
∂xij′
∣∣∣∣
(x)
Then P (=(x)) > P (x) unless =(x) = x.
The Baum-Welch algorithm is a classic technique used to find the unknown parameters of a
hidden Markov model (HMM). A HMM describes the joint probability of a collection of “hidden”
and observed discrete random variables. It relies on the assumption that the i-th hidden variable
given the (i− 1)-th hidden variable is independent of previous hidden variables, and the current
observation variables depend only on the current hidden state. The Baum-Welch algorithm uses the
well known EM algorithm to find the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters of a hidden
Markov model given a set of observed feature vectors. More detailed exposition of these ideas can
be found here [8]. The probability of making a specific time series of observations of length T can
be shown to be a homogeneous polynomial P of degree T with nonnegative (integer) coefficients of
the model parameters. Baum-Welch algorithm is homologous to the iterative process derived by
applying the Baum-Eagon theorem to polynomial P [5, 36].
In a nutshell, both Baum-Welch and MWU` in congestion games are special cases of the
Baum-Eagon iterative process (for different polynomials P ).
3.4 Multiplicative Weights Update
In this section, we describe the MWU dynamics (both the linear MWU`, and the exponential
MWUe variants) applied in congestion games. The update rule (function) ξ : ∆ → ∆ (where
p(t+ 1) = ξ(p(t))) for the linear variant MWU` is as follows:
piγ(t+ 1) = (ξ(p(t)))iγ = piγ(t)
1− iciγ(t)
1− icˆi(t) , ∀i ∈ N ,∀γ ∈ Si, (1)
where i is a constant (can depend on player i but not on p) so that both enumerator and denominator
of the fraction in (1) are positive (and thus the fraction is well defined). Under the assumption that
1/i >
1
β
def
= supi,p∈∆,γ∈Si {ciγ}, it follows that 1/i > ciγ for all i, γ and hence 1/i > cˆi.
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The update rule (function) η : ∆→ ∆ (where p(t+ 1) = η(p(t))) for the exponential variant
MWUe is as follows:
piγ(t+ 1) = (η(p(t)))iγ = piγ(t)
(1− i)ciγ(t)∑
γ′∈Si piγ′(t)(1− i)ciγ′ (t)
, ∀i ∈ N , ∀γ ∈ Si, (2)
where i < 1 is a constant (can depend on player i but not on p).
Remark 3.5. Observe that ∆ is invariant under the discrete dynamics (1), (2) defined above.
If piγ = 0 then piγ remains zero, and if it is positive, it remains positive (both numerator and
denominator are positive) and also is true that
∑
γ∈Si piγ = 1 for all agents i. A point p
∗ is called
a fixed point if it stays invariant under the update rule of the dynamics, namely ξ(p∗) = p∗ or
η(p∗) = p∗. A point p∗ is a fixed point of (1), (2) if for all i, γ with p∗iγ > 0 we have that ciγ = cˆi.
To see why, observe that if p∗iγ , p
∗
iγ′ > 0, then ciγ = ciγ′ and thus ciγ = cˆi. We conclude that the set
of fixed points of both dynamics (1), (2) coincide and are supersets of the set of Nash equilibria of
the corresponding congestion game.
4 Convergence of MWU` to Nash Equilibria
We first prove that MWU` (1) converges to fixed points. Technically, we establish that function
Ψ
def
= Es∼p [Φ(s)] is strictly decreasing along any nontrivial (i.e. nonequilibrium) trajectory, where
Φ is the potential function of the congestion game as defined in Section 3. Formally we show the
following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Ψ is decreasing). Function Ψ is decreasing w.r.t. time, i.e., Ψ(p(t+ 1)) ≤ Ψ(p(t))
where equality Ψ(p(t+ 1)) = Ψ(p(t)) holds only at fixed points.
We define the function
Q(p)
def
=
∑
i∈N
(1/i − 1/β) ·∑
γ∈Si
piγ
+ 1/β ·∏
i∈N
∑
γ∈Si
piγ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant term
−Ψ(p), (3)
and show that Q(p) is strictly increasing w.r.t time, unless p is a fixed point. Observe that∑
γ∈Si piγ = 1 since p lies in ∆, but we include this terms in Q for technical reasons that will be
made clear later in the section. By showing that Q is increasing with time, Theorem 4.1 trivially
follows since Q = const − Ψ where const = ∑i∈N 1/i. To show that Q(p) is strictly increasing
w.r.t time, unless p is a fixed point, we use a generalization of an inequality by Baum and Eagon [5]
on function Q.
Corollary 4.2 (Generalization of Baum-Eagon). Theorem 3.4 holds even if P is non-homogeneous.
Proof. We prove it by doing a reduction. Let P (x) be a non-homogeneous polynomial of degree d
on variables {xij} with x ∈ D (D is a product of simplices). We introduce a dummy variable y that
is always set to one and D′ = {(x, y) : x ∈ D, y = 1}. We define the polynomial P ′(x, y) where for
each monomial of P with total degree d′ so that d′ ≤ d, we have the same monomial in P ′ multiplied
by yd−d′ . It is obvious to see that P ′ is homogeneous of degree d. It is also obvious to check that
the dynamics as defined in Theorem 3.4 for polynomial P ′ remains the same as for polynomial P
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(apart from the extra(dummy) variable y which is always one) since if y = 1 at time t then at time
t+ 1, y is equal to
y
∂P ′(x,y)
∂y
y
∂P ′(x,y)
∂y
= 1, i.e., y indeed is always equal to one and ∂P
′(x,y)
∂xij
∣∣∣
(x,1)
= ∂P (x)∂xij
∣∣∣
(x)
.
We conclude that Theorem 3.4 holds for non-homogeneous polynomials.
We want to apply Corollary 4.2 on Q. To do so, it suffices to show that Q(p) is a polynomial
with nonnegative coefficients.
Lemma 4.3. Q(p) is a polynomial with respect to piγ and has nonnegative coefficients.
Proof. In a congestion game, the cost of the function of any player i can be written as the sum of
the potential function Φ(s) and a dummy term which depends on the actions of all the rest players
(not on the actions of player i), i.e.,
ci(s) = Φ(s) +Di(s−i). (4)
By taking expectations in Equation (4) we get that cˆi = Ψ + Es−i∼p−i [Di(s−i)]. Using the law
of total expectation it also follows that the expected cost of player i satisfies cˆi =
∑
γ∈Si piγciγ .
Therefore
∑
γ∈Si piγciγ = Ψ(p) + Es−i∼p−i [Di(s−i)].
We take the partial derivative of both L.H.S and R.H.S for variable piγ and we conclude that
the following holds:
ciγ =
∂Ψ(p)
∂piγ
+
∂Es−i∼p−i [Di(s−i)]
∂piγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
, therefore
∂Q(p)
∂piγ
= 1/i − 1/β + 1/β ·
∏
j 6=i
∑
γ∈Sj
pjγ
− ciγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/i−ciγ since p∈∆
(5)
Since the R.H.S of (5) does not depend on piγ , Q is a linear function w.r.t piγ for all i ∈ N , γ ∈ Si.
Therefore, it is a polynomial of degree N with respect to p.
Finally, we will show that all the coefficients of the polynomial Q are non-negative. Let’s focus
on the monomials containing the term piγ (for some i, γ). By (5) we have that the summation of
those monomials is equal to (1/i− 1/β)piγ +
(
1/β ·∏j 6=i (∑γ∈Sj pjγ)− ciγ) piγ which expands to
(1/i − 1/β)piγ +
(
1/β ·∑s−i∈S−i∏j 6=i pjsj − ciγ) piγ , where S−i def= ×j 6=iSj . However, we have
ciγ =
∑
s−i∈S−i
∏
j 6=i
pjsj ·
(∑
e∈γ
ce (1 + ke(s−i))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 1
β
by definition of β
,
where ke(s−i) denotes the number of players apart from i that choose edge e in the strategy profile
s−i. Combining everything together we have that summation of all monomials including piγ is equal
to:
(1/i − 1/β)piγ +
(
1/β −
(∑
e∈γ
ce(1 + ke(s−i))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 1
β
)
·
∑
s−i∈S−i
∏
j 6=i
pjsj · piγ
Clearly, each summand has a nonnegative coefficient. Hence, each monomial containing piγ has
a nonnegative coefficient. The above is true for all i, γ and the claim follows.
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Using Lemma 4.3 and Corollary 4.2 we show the following:
Theorem 4.4. Let Q be the function defined in (3). Let also p(t) ∈ ∆ be the point MWU` (1)
outputs at time t with update rule ξ. It holds that Q(p(t + 1))
def
= Q(ξ(p(t))) > Q(p(t)) unless
ξ(p(t)) = p(t) (fixed point). Namely Q is strictly increasing with respect to the number of iterations
t unless MWU` is at a fixed point.
Proof. By Lemma 4.3, Q(p) is a polynomial with has nonnegative coefficients. Therefore, we can
apply Corollary 4.2 for polynomial Q. In this case, the Baum-Eagon theorem defines the map:
piγ(t+ 1) =
(
piγ(t)
∂Q
∂piγ
∣∣∣∣
(p(t))
)/∑
δ∈Si
piδ
∂Q
∂piδ
∣∣∣∣
(p(t))
(5)
=
piγ(t)(1/i − ciγ)∑
δ∈Si piδ(t)(1/i − ciδ)
= piγ(t)
1/i − ciγ
1/i − cˆi ,
which coincides with MWU` (1). Thus, it is true that Q(p(t + 1)) > Q(p(t)) unless p(t + 1) =
p(t). This proof justifies the reason we added the term
∑
i∈N
(
(1/i − 1/β) ·
∑
γ∈Si piγ
)
+ 1/β ·∏
i∈N
(∑
γ∈Si piγ
)
in Q, namely so that the partial derivatives give us MWU` dynamics.
As stated earlier in the section, if Q(p(t)) is strictly increasing with respect to time t unless p(t)
is a fixed point, it follows that the expected potential function Ψ(p(t)) = const−Q(p(t)) is strictly
decreasing unless p(t) is a fixed point and Theorem 4.1 is proved. Moreover, we can derive the fact
that our dynamics converges to fixed points as a corollary of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.5 (Convergence to fixed points). MWU` dynamics (1) converges to fixed points.
Proof. Let Ω ⊂ ∆ be the set of limit points of an orbit p(t). Ψ(p(t)) is decreasing with respect
to time t by Theorem 4.1 and so, because Ψ is bounded on ∆, Ψ(p(t)) converges as t → ∞ to
Ψ∗ = inft{Ψ(p(t))}. By continuity of Ψ we get that Ψ(y) = limt→∞Ψ(p(t)) = Ψ∗ for all y ∈ Ω. So
Ψ is constant on Ω. Also y(t) = limn→∞ p(tn + t) as n→∞ for some sequence of times {ti} and so
y(t) lies in Ω, i.e. Ω is invariant. Thus, if y ≡ y(0) ∈ Ω the orbit y(t) lies in Ω and so Ψ(y(t)) = Ψ∗
on the orbit. But Ψ is strictly decreasing except on equilibrium orbits and so Ω consists entirely of
fixed points.
We conclude the section by strengthening the convergence result (i.e., Theorem 4.5). We show
that if the initial distribution p is in the interior of ∆ then we have convergence to Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4.6 (Convergence to Nash equilibria). Assume that the fixed points of (1) are isolated.
Let p(0) be a point in the interior of ∆. It follows that limt→∞ p(t) = p∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We showed in Theorem 4.5 that MWU` dynamics (1) converges, hence limt→∞ p(t) exists
(under the assumption that the fixed points are isolated) and is equal to a fixed point of the dynamics
p∗. Also it is clear from the dynamics that ∆ is invariant, i.e.,
∑
δ∈Sj pjδ(t) = 1, pjδ(t) > 0 for all j
and t ≥ 0 since p(0) is in the interior of ∆.
Assume that p∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exists a player i and a strategy γ ∈ Si so
that ciγ(p
∗) < cˆi(p∗) (on mixed strategies p∗) and p∗iγ = 0. Fix a ζ > 0 and let Uζ = {p : ciγ(p) <
cˆi(p)− ζ}. By continuity we have that Uζ is open. It is also true that p∗ ∈ Uζ for ζ small enough.
Since p(t) converges to p∗ as t→∞, there exists a time t0 so that for all t′ ≥ t0 we have that
p(t′) ∈ Uζ . However, from MWU` dynamics (1) we get that if p(t′) ∈ Uζ then 1−iciγ(t′) > 1−icˆi(t′)
and hence piγ(t
′ + 1) = piγ(t′)
1−iciγ(t′)
1−icˆi(t′) ≥ piγ(t′) > 0, i.e., piγ(t′) is positive and increasing with
t′ ≥ t0. We reached a contradiction since piγ(t)→ p∗iγ = 0, thus p∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
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5 Non-Convergence of MWUe: Limit Cycle and Chaos
We consider a symmetric two agent congestion game with two edges e1, e2. Both agents have the
same two available strategies γ1 = {e1} and γ2 = {e2}. We denote x, y the probability that the first
and the second agent respectively choose strategy γ1.
For the first example, we assume that ce1(l) =
1
2 · l and ce2(l) = 12 · l. Computing the ex-
pected costs we get that c1γ1 =
1+y
2 , c1γ2 =
2−y
2 , c2γ1 =
1+x
2 , c2γ2 =
2−x
2 . MWUe then becomes
xt+1 = xt
(1−1)
(yt+1)
2
xt(1−1)
yt+1
2 +(1−xt)(1−1)
2−yt
2
(first player) and yt+1 = yt
(1−2)
xt+1
2
yt(1−2)
xt+1
2 +(1−yt)(1−2)
2−xt
2
(sec-
ond player). We assume that 1 = 2 and also that x0 = y0 (players start with the same mixed
strategy. Due to symmetry, it follows that xt = yt for all t ∈ N, thus it suffices to keep track only of
one variable (we have reduced the number of variables of the update rule of the dynamics to one)
and the dynamics becomes xt+1 = xt
(1−)
xt+1
2
xt(1−)
xt+1
2 +(1−xt)(1−)
2−xt
2
. Finally, we choose  = 1 − e−10
and we get
xt+1 = H(xt) = xt
e−5(xt+1)
xte−5(xt+1) + (1− xt)e−5(2−xt)
,
i.e., we denote H(x) = xe
−5(x+1)
xe−5(x+1)+(1−x)e−5(2−x) .
For the second example, we assume that ce1(l) =
1
4 · l and ce2(l) = 1.44 · l. Computing the expected
costs we get that c1γ1 =
1+y
4 , c1γ2 =
1.4(2−y)
4 , c2γ1 =
1+x
4 , c2γ2 =
1.4(2−x)
4 . MWUe then becomes
xt+1 = xt
(1−1)
(yt+1)
4
xt(1−1)
yt+1
4 +(1−xt)(1−1)
1.4(2−yt)
4
(first player) and yt+1 = yt
(1−2)
xt+1
4
yt(1−2)
xt+1
4 +(1−yt)(1−2)
1.4(2−xt)
4
(second player). We assume that 1 = 2 and also that x0 = y0 (players start with the same mixed
strategy. Similarly, due to symmetry, it follows that xt = yt for all t ∈ N, thus it suffices to keep track
only of one variable and the dynamics becomes xt+1 = xt
(1−)
xt+1
4
xt(1−)
xt+1
4 +(1−xt)(1−)
1.4(2−xt)
4
. Finally, we
choose  = 1− e−40 and we get
xt+1 = G(xt) = xt
e−10(xt+1)
xte−10(xt+1) + (1− xt)e−14(2−xt)
,
i.e., we denote G(x) = xe
−10(x+1)
xe−10(x+1)+(1−x)e−14(2−x) .
5.1 Analyzing xt+1 = H(xt)
5.1.1 The signs of the derivative of H(H(x))
In this subsection we analyze the monotonicity of H(H(x)).
Lemma 5.1. There exist numbers 0 < y0 < x0 < 1/2 < x1 < y1 < 1 so that:
• For x ∈ [0, y0], [x0, x1] and [y1, 1] H(H(x)) is strictly increasing,
• for x ∈ [y0, x0] and x ∈ [x1, y1] H(H(x)) is strictly decreasing,
where x0 =
1
10(5−
√
15) ≈ 0.1127, x1 = 110(5 +
√
15) ≈ 0.8873, y0 ∈ (0, x0) so that H(y0) = x0 and
y1 ∈ (x1, 1) so that H(y1) = x1.
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Figure 1: Detailed plot of H2.
Proof. First of all it holds that dH(H(x))dx = H
′(H(x)) ·H ′(x), therefore we will analyze the signs
of H ′(H(x)) and H ′(x) separately. Direct calculations give H ′(x) = e5+10x 1−10x+10x
2
(e10x(−1+x)−e5x)2 . The
roots of 1− 10x+ 10x2 are x0 and x1 (defined in the statement). We conclude that H is strictly
increasing in [0, x0] and [x1, 1] and strictly decreasing in [x0, x1].
Moreover H(x0) ≈ 0.8593 > x0 thus lies in (1/2, x1) and H(x1) ≈ 0.1406 < x1 and hence lies in
(x0, 1/2). Let y0 ∈ (0, x0) so that H(y0) = x0 (since H is strictly increasing in [0, x0], H(0) = 0 and
H(x0) > x0, there exists a unique y0) and by similar argument let y1 the unique real in [x1, 1] so
that H(y1) = x1.
We have the following cases:
• For x ∈ (0, y0) we get that both H ′(x) and H ′(H(x)) are positive and hence H(H(x)) is
strictly increasing in [0, y0] (area 1 of the figure 1).
• For x ∈ (y0, x0) we get that H ′(x) is positive and H ′(H(x)) is negative, thus H(H(x)) strictly
decreasing in [y0, x0] (area 2 of the figure 1).
• For x ∈ (x0, x1) we get that H ′ is negative and since (H(x1), H(x0)) ⊂ (x0, x1), H is monotone
we have that H ′(H(x)) is also negative, namely H(H(x)) is strictly increasing in [x0, x1] (areas
3,4,5 and 6 of the figure 1).
• For x ∈ (x1, y1) we get that H ′(x) is positive and H ′(H(x)) is negative and hence H(H(x)) is
strictly decreasing in [x1, y1] (area 7 of the figure 1).
• For x ∈ (y1, 1) we get that H ′(x) is positive and H ′(H(x)) is positive, thus H(H(x)) strictly
increasing in [y1, 1] (area 8 of the figure 1).
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5.1.2 The fixed points of H(H(x))
Lemma 5.2. H(H(x)) has 5 fixed points, 0 < ρ1 < 1/2 < ρ2 = 1− ρ1 < 1. Moreover H(H(x))− x
is positive in (0, ρ1), (1/2, ρ2) and negative in (ρ1, 1/2), (ρ2, 1).
Proof. By direct calculations we get that
H(H(x)) =
x
(e−5+10x(1− x) + x)
(
x
e−5+10x(1−x)+x + e
−5+ 10x
e−5+10x(1−x)+x
(
1− x
e−5+10x(1−x)+x
))
=
x
x+ e
10x
(
1+ 1
e−5+10x(1−x)+x
)
−10
(1− x)
It is clear that H(H(0)) = 0, H(H(1)) = 1 and H(H(1/2)) = 1/2. In order to find the other
fixed points, it suffices to analyze the roots of the function 1− x− e10x
(
1+ 1
e−5+10x(1−x)+x
)
−10
(1− x).
By cancelling the common factor (1 − x) (we have already take into account x = 1), we have to
analyze g(x)
def
= 1− e10x
(
1+ 1
e−5+10x(1−x)+x
)
−10
. It follows by the monotonicity of ex that g(x) = 0 iff
10x
(
1 + 1
e−5+10x(1−x)+x
)
− 10 = 0, i.e., x
e−5+10x(1−x)+x = 1− x.
To solve the equation above, it suffices to analyze the roots of the function
g1(x)
def
= x− (1− x) (e−5+10x(1− x) + x) = x2 − e−5+10x(1− x)2.
By direct calculation we have to find the roots of g2(x)
def
= x − e−2.5+5x(1 − x) (since 0 ≤ x ≤ 1).
Finally, we take the derivative of g2 which is g
′
2(x) = 1 + e
−2.5+5x − 5e−2.5+5x(1 − x) = 1 +
e−2.5+5x(5x − 4). Clearly g′′2(x) is negative in [0, 3/5), positive in (3/5, 1] and zero at 3/5. Also
g′2(0) ≈ 0.67 > 0, g′2(3/5) ≈ −0.648 < 0 and g′2(1) > 0, i.e., by Bolzano’s theorem g′2(x) has a unique
root in (0, 3/5) (say α1) and a unique root in (3/5, 1) (say α2). Finally, since g
′
2(1/2) = −0.5 < 0
and g′2(x0) ≈ 0.504 > 0, it follows that x0 < α1 < 1/2 and since g′2(x1) ≈ 4.026 we get that
1/2 < α2 < x1. By the above and Rolle’s theorem we conclude that H(H(x)) has at most 3 distinct
fixed points apart from 0, 1. Since g2 is increasing in (0, x0) and g2(x0) ≈ −0.015 < 0, g2 has no
root in (0, x0]. Moreover, since g2(1/4) ≈ 0.035 > 0, it follows that g2 has a root in (x0, 1/4) (say
ρ1). Hence H(H(ρ1)) = ρ1 and 1/2 > 1/4 > ρ1 > x0. By observing that H(1− x) = 1−H(x), we
get that H(1−H(x)) = 1−H(H(x)) and also H(H(1− x)) = H(1−H(x)), i.e.,
H(H(1− x)) = 1−H(H(x)).
We substitute x with ρ1 and we get H(H(1−ρ1)) = 1−H(H(ρ1)) = 1−ρ1, namely ρ2 def= 1−ρ1 > 3/4
is the remaining fixed point of H(H(x)). Whether H(H(x))− x is positive or negative follows by
same arguments. See also the figure 1 for a visualization of this theorem.
5.1.3 Periodic orbits
Theorem 5.3. For all but a measure zero set S of x ∈ (0, 1) we get that limt→∞H2t(x) = ρ1 or ρ2.
Moreover, H(ρ1) = ρ2 and H(ρ2) = ρ1, i.e., {ρ1, ρ2} is a periodic orbit. Thus, all but a measure
zero set S of initial conditions converge to the limit cycle {ρ1, ρ2}. Finally, the initial points in S
converge to the equilibrium 12 .
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(a) Exponential MWUe: Plot of function H
(blue) and its iterated versions H2 (red), H3
(yellow). Function y(x) = x is also included.
(b) Linear MWU`: Plot of function H` (blue)
and its iterated versions H2` (red) and H
3
` (yel-
low). Function y(x) = x is also included.
(c) Exponential MWUe: Plot of function H
10.
Function y(x) = x is also included.
(d) Linear MWU`: Plot of function H
10
` . Func-
tion y(x) = x is also included.
Figure 2: We compare and contrast MWUe (left) and MWU` (right) in the same two agent two
strategy/edges congestion game with ce1(l) =
1
2 ·l and ce2(l) = 12 ·l and same learning rate  = 1−e−10.
MWUe converges to a limit cycle whereas MWU` equilibrates. Function y(x) = x is also included
in the graphs to help identify fixed points and periodic points.
Proof. Since (ρ1, 1/2) ⊂ [x0, x1], from Lemma 5.1 it holds that H(H(x)) is strictly increasing in
(ρ1, 1/2). Thus if ρ1 < x < 1/2, it follows ρ1 = H(H(ρ1)) < H(H(x)) < H(H(1/2)) = 1/2, i.e., the
interval [ρ1, 1/2] is invariant under H ◦H. Consider an initial condition z0 ∈ (ρ1, 1/2) and define
the sequence zi+1 = H(H(zi). It is clear that zi ∈ (ρ1, 1/2) for all i ∈ N from previous argument.
Additionally, (zi)i∈N is strictly decreasing because zi+1 = H(H(zi)) < zi (from Lemma 5.2 we have
H(H(x)) < x for all x ∈ (ρ1, 1/2)). Finally, zi > ρ1 for all i ∈ N (lower bounded), and thus the
sequence converges to some limit l. It is easy to see that ρ1 ≤ l < 1/2 and also H(H(l)) = l by
continuity of H, namely l = ρ1 (using Lemma 5.2). Therefore, we showed that for any initial
point z0 ∈ [ρ1, 1/2), we get that limt→∞H2t(z0) = ρ1. Analogously holds that for any initial point
z0 ∈ (1/2, ρ2], we get that limt→∞H2t(z0) = ρ2. It is clear that limt→∞H2t(1/2) = 1/2 (1/2 is a
fixed point of H).
Moreover a point z ∈ (x0, ρ1) we have that z′ = H(H(z)) ∈ (HH(x0), HH(ρ1)) (H ◦ H is
strictly increasing by Lemma 5.1). Since z < ρ1, we have that z
′ = H(H(z)) > z (from Lemma 5.2).
Therefore for any initial point z0 ∈ (x0, ρ1), the sequence (H2t(z0))t∈N is strictly increasing and
bounded by ρ1, hence it converges. By similar argument as before we conclude that limt→∞H2t(z0) =
ρ1. Analogously, it holds for any initial point z0 ∈ (ρ2, x1) that limt→∞H2t(z0) = ρ1.
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We continue by considering the case that z ∈ (y0, x0). From Lemma 5.1 we have that z′ =
H(H(z)) ∈ (H(H(x0)), H(H(y0))). From Lemma 5.2 H(H(x0)) > x0 and H(H(y0)) = H(x0) < x1.
Therefore z′ ∈ (x0, x1) and from the previous cases we have that limt→∞H2t(z) = ρ1 or ρ2, unless
z′ = 1/2, i.e., unless H(H(z)) = 1/2. It is completely analogous the case z ∈ (x1, y1).
To finish the proof, assume z0 ∈ (0, y0). From Lemma 5.1 is holds that z1 = H(H(z0)) > z0.
Let n be the minimum index for t so that zn = H
2n(z0) > y0 (n exists and is finite, otherwise the
sequence (H2t)t∈N would converge to a fixed point, which is contradiction because there is no fixed
point in (0, y0)). It is clear that zn−1 < y0 and hence
y0 < H(H(zn−1)) < H(H(y0)) = H(x0) < x1.
So either zn = 1/2 or H(H(zn)) = 1/2 or else the sequence H
2t converges to ρ1 or ρ2 (by reduction
to the previous cases). Completely analogous is the remaining case z0 ∈ (y1, 1).
Therefore we showed the following: For all z ∈ (0, 1), either there exists a number k ∈ N
so that H2k(z) = 12 or the limit limt→∞H
2t(z) exists and is equal to ρ1 or ρ2. Finally, the set
{z ∈ (0, 1) : ∃k ∈ N s.t H2k(z) = 12} has measure zero (from Lemma 5.1, the set {z : H(H(z)) = 1/2}
has cardinality at most 5). See also figure 2(c) for a visualization of the theorem. In contrast, figure
2(d) shows that the linear variant converges to the fixed point 1/2 (x = 1/2, y = 1/2 is a Nash
equilibrium of the corresponding game, i.e., the first example of Section 5).
5.2 Analyzing xt+1 = G(xt)
Lemma 5.4. G has 3 fixed points 0 < 3/4 < 1 in [0, 1].
Proof. Let x be a fixed point of G. If x 6= 0, 1 then 1 + x = 1410(2− x), therefore x = 34 .
Lemma 5.5. There exist a y ∈ [0, 1] so that G(G(G(y))) = y, G(y) 6= y, G(G(y)) 6= y and
G(G(y)) 6= G(y). Hence y,G(y), G(G(y)) is a periodic orbit of length three.
Proof. It holds that G(G(G(0.4))) − 0.4 ≈ −0.158 and G(G(G(0.5))) − 0.5 ≈ 0.496 and hence
by Bolzano’s theorem there exists a y ∈ (0.4, 0.5) so that G(G(G(y))) = y. Observe that y
cannot be a fixed point of G because of Lemma 5.4. If G(G(y)) = y, then by applying G we
get G(G(G(y))) = G(y) and hence y = G(y) (contradiction since y cannot be a fixed point).
Finally, if G(G(y)) = G(y) then by applying G ◦G we get G(G(G(G(y)))) = G(G(G(y))), and since
G(G(G(y))) = y we have that G(y) = y (contradiction again). See also figure 3(a) for a visualization
of the theorem.
Corollary 5.6. There exist two player two strategy symmetric congestion games such that MWUe
has periodic orbits of length n for any natural number n > 0 and as well as an uncountably infinite
set of “scrambled” initial conditions (Li-Yorke chaos).
Proof. It follows from Li-Yorke theorem (Theorem 3.3) and Lemma 5.5. See also figure 3(c) for a
visualization of the theorem. In contrast, figure 3(d) shows that the linear variant converges to the
fixed point 3/4 (x = 3/4, y = 3/4 is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game, i.e., the second
example of Section 5).
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Figure 3: We compare and contrast MWUe (left) and MWU` (right) in the same two agent two
strategy/edges congestion game with ce1(l) =
1
4 · l and ce2(l) = 1.44 · l and same learning rate
 = 1− e−40. MWUe exhibits sensitivity to initial conditions whereas MWU` equilibrates. Function
y(x) = x is also included in the graphs to help identify fixed points and periodic points.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have analyzed MWU` in congestion games where agents use arbitrary admissible constants as
learning rates  and showed convergence to exact Nash equilibria. We have also shown that this
result is not true for the nearly homologous exponential variant MWUe even for the simplest case
of two-agent, two-strategy load balancing games. There we prove that such dynamics can provably
lead to limit cycles or even chaotic behavior.
For a small enough learning rate  the behavior of MWUe approaches that of its smooth variant,
replicator dynamics, and hence convergence is once again guaranteed [23]. This means that as we
increase the learning rate  from near zero values we start off with a convergent system and we
end up with a chaotic one. Numerical experiments establish that between the convergent region
and the chaotic region there exists a range of values for  for which the system exhibits periodic
behavior. Period doubling is known as standard route for 1-dimensional chaos (e.g. logistic map)
and is characterized by unexpected regularities such as the Feigenbaum constant [35]. Elucidating
these connections is an interesting open problem. More generally, what other type regularities can
be established in these non-equilibrium systems?
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Another interesting question has to do with developing a better understanding of the set of
conditions that result to non-converging trajectories. So far, it has been critical for our non-
convergent examples that the system starts from a symmetric initial condition. Whether such
irregular MWUe trajectories can be constructed for generic initial conditions, possibly in larger
congestion games, is not known. Nevertheless, the non-convergent results, despite their non-generic
nature are rather useful since they imply that we cannot hope to leverage the power of Baum-Eagon
techniques for MWUe. In conclusion, establishing generic (non)convergence results (e.g. for most
initial conditions, most congestion games) for MWUe with constant step size is an interesting future
direction.
Acknowledgements
Georgios Piliouras would like to thank Ioannis Avramopoulos for introducing him to the Li-Yorke
literature. Gerasimos Palaiopanos would like to acknowledge a SUTD Presidential fellowship. Ioannis
Panageas would like to acknowledge a MIT-SUTD postdoctoral fellowship. Georgios Piliouras would
like to acknowledge SUTD grant SRG ESD 2015 097 and MOE AcRF Tier 2 Grant 2016-T2-1-170.
Part of this work was completed while Ioannis Panageas was a PhD student at Georgia Institute
of Technology. Part of the work was completed while Ioannis Panageas and Georgios Piliouras
were visiting scientists at the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing. Part of the work was
completed while Georgios Piliouras was a visiting scientist at the Hausdorff Research Institute for
Mathematics (HIM) during the Trimester Program on Combinatorial Optimization.
References
[1] Heiner Ackermann, Petra Berenbrink, Simon Fischer, and Martin Hoefer. Concurrent imitation
dynamics in congestion games. In PODC, pages 63–72, New York, USA, 2009. ACM.
[2] Sanjeev Arora, Elad Hazan, and Satyen Kale. The multiplicative weights update method: a
meta-algorithm and applications. Theory of Computing, 8(1):121–164, 2012.
[3] Ioannis Avramopoulos. Evolutionary stability implies asymptotic stability under multiplicative
weights. CoRR, abs/1601.07267, 2016.
[4] Maria-Florina Balcan, Florin Constantin, and Ruta Mehta. The weighted majority algorithm
does not converge in nearly zero-sum games. In ICML Workshop on Markets, Mechanisms and
Multi-Agent Models, 2012.
[5] Leonard E. Baum and J. A. Eagon. An inequality with applications to statistical estimation for
probabilistic functions of markov processes and to a model of ecology. Bulletin of the American
Mathematical Society, 73(3):360–363, 1967.
[6] P. Berenbrink, M. Hoefer, and T. Sauerwald. Distributed selfish load balancing on networks.
In ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG), 2014.
[7] Petra Berenbrink, Tom Friedetzky, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Zengjian Hu,
and Russell Martin. Distributed selfish load balancing. SIAM J. Comput., 37(4):1163–1181,
November 2007.
15
[8] Jeff A Bilmes et al. A gentle tutorial of the em algorithm and its application to parameter
estimation for gaussian mixture and hidden markov models. International Computer Science
Institute, 4(510):126, 1998.
[9] I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, and A. Skopalik. Efficient computation of approximate
pure nash equilibria in congestion games. In FOCS, 2011.
[10] Nikolo Cesa-Bianchi and Gabor Lugoisi. Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
[11] Erick Chastain, Adi Livnat, Christos Papadimitriou, and Umesh Vazirani. Algorithms, games,
and evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 111(29):10620–10623,
2014.
[12] Erick Chastain, Adi Livnat, Christos H. Papadimitriou, and Umesh V. Vazirani. Multiplicative
updates in coordination games and the theory of evolution. In ITCS, pages 57–58, 2013.
[13] S. Chien and A. Sinclair. Convergence to approximate nash equilibria in congestion games. In
Games and Economic Behavior, pages 315–327, 2011.
[14] G Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias. The price of anarchy of finite congestion games. STOC,
pages 67–73, 2005.
[15] C. Daskalakis, R. Frongillo, C. Papadimitriou, G. Pierrakos, and G. Valiant. On learning
algorithms for Nash equilibria. Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), pages
114–125, 2010.
[16] Bart de Keijzer, Guido Scha¨fer, and Orestis A. Telelis. On the inefficiency of equilibria in linear
bottleneck congestion games. In Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, and PaulG. Spirakis,
editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, volume 6386 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
335–346. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
[17] Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, and Paul G. Spirakis. Atomic congestion games: Fast,
myopic and concurrent. In Burkhard Monien and Ulf-Peter Schroeder, editors, Algorithmic
Game Theory, volume 4997 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 121–132. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
[18] Dimitris Fotakis, Spyros Kontogiannis, and Paul Spirakis. Selfish unsplittable flows. Theoretical
Computer Science, 348(2–3):226–239, 2005. Automata, Languages and Programming: Algo-
rithms and Complexity (ICALP-A 2004)Automata, Languages and Programming: Algorithms
and Complexity 2004.
[19] Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press Books.
The MIT Press, 1998.
[20] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
[21] R. Kleinberg, K. Ligett, G. Piliouras, and E´. Tardos. Beyond the Nash equilibrium barrier. In
Symposium on Innovations in Computer Science (ICS), 2011.
[22] R. Kleinberg, G. Piliouras, and E´. Tardos. Load balancing without regret in the bulletin board
model. Distributed Computing, 24(1):21–29, 2011.
16
[23] Robert Kleinberg, Georgios Piliouras, and E´va Tardos. Multiplicative updates outperform
generic no-regret learning in congestion games. In ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
(STOC), 2009.
[24] Elias Koutsoupias and Christos H. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In STACS, pages
404–413, 1999.
[25] Tien-Yien Li and James A. Yorke. Period three implies chaos. The American Mathematical
Monthly, 82(10):985–992, 1975.
[26] Ruta Mehta, Ioannis Panageas, and Georgios Piliouras. Natural selection as an inhibitor of
genetic diversity: Multiplicative weights updates algorithm and a conjecture of haploid genetics.
In Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2015.
[27] Reshef Meir and David Parke. A note on sex, evolution, and the multiplicative updates
algorithm. In AAMAS, 2015.
[28] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, pages
124–143, 1996.
[29] Christos Papadimitriou and Georgios Piliouras. From nash equilibria to chain recurrent sets:
Solution concepts and topology. In ITCS, 2016.
[30] G. Piliouras and J. S. Shamma. Optimization despite chaos: Convex relaxations to complex
limit sets via Poincare´ recurrence. In SODA, 2014.
[31] R.W. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. International
Journal of Game Theory, 2(1):65–67, 1973.
[32] Tim Roughgarden. Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. In Proc. of STOC, pages
513–522, 2009.
[33] Tim Roughgarden and E´va Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the ACM (JACM),
49(2):236–259, 2002.
[34] A.N. Sharkovskii. Co-existence of cycles of a continuous mapping of the line into itself. Ukrainian
Math. J., 16:61 – 71, 1964.
[35] Steven Strogatz. Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos. Perseus Publishing, 2000.
[36] Lloyd R Welch. Hidden markov models and the baum-welch algorithm. IEEE Information
Theory Society Newsletter, 53(4):10–13, 2003.
17
